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Abstract
In this paper, we study a stochastic disclosure control problem using information-theoretic methods. The useful data to be
disclosed depend on private data that should be protected. Thus, we design a privacy mechanism to produce new data which
maximizes the disclosed information about the useful data under a strong χ2-privacy criterion. For sufficiently small leakage, the
privacy mechanism design problem can be geometrically studied in the space of probability distributions by a local approximation
of the mutual information. By using methods from Euclidean information geometry, the original highly challenging optimization
problem can be reduced to a problem of finding the principal right-singular vector of a matrix, which characterizes the optimal
privacy mechanism. In two extensions we first consider a noisy disclosure channel and then we look for a mechanism which finds
U based on observing X , maximizing the mutual information between U and Y while satisfying the privacy criterion on U and
Z under the Markov chain (Z, Y )−X − U .
I. INTRODUCTION
The amount of data created by humans, robots, advanced cyber-physical and software systems and billions of interconnected
sensors is growing rapidly. Unwanted inference possibilities from this data cause privacy threats. Thus, privacy mechanisms
are required before data can be disclosed.
Accordingly, the information theoretic approach to privacy is receiving increased attention and related works can be found
in [1]–[18]. One of the earliest works is [1], where a source coding problem with secrecy is studied. In both [1] and [2],
the privacy-utility trade-off is considered using expected distortion and equivocation as measure of utility and privacy. In [3],
the concept of a privacy funnel is introduced, where the privacy-utility trade-off under log-loss distortion is considered. In
[4], the concept of differential privacy is introduced, which aims to minimize the chance of identifying the membership in
a database. In [5], the hypothesis test performance of an adversary is used to measure the privacy leakage. The concept of
maximal leakage is introduced in [6] and some bounds on privacy utility trade-off are provided. In [7], fundamental limits
of privacy utility trade-off are studied measuring the leakage using estimation-theoretic guarantees. Properties of rate-privacy
functions are studied in [8], where either maximal correlation or mutual information are used for measuring privacy. Biometric
identification systems with no privacy leakage are studied in [9].
Our problem formulation is closest related to [10] where the problem of maximizing mutual information I(U ;Y ) given the
leakage constraint I(U ;X) ≤  and Markov chain X −Y −U is studied. Under the assumption of perfect privacy, i.e.,  = 0,
it is shown that the privacy mechanism design problem can be reduced to a standard linear program. In [11], the work has
been extended considering the privacy utility trade-off with a rate constraint for the disclosed data.
In this paper, we consider a similar problem as in [10] depicted in Fig. 1, where an agent wants to disclose some useful
data to a user. The useful data is denoted by the random variable (RV) Y . Furthermore, Y is dependent on the private data
denoted by RV X , which is not accessible to the agent. Due to privacy considerations, the agent can not release the useful
data directly. So, the agent uses a privacy mechanism to produce data U that can be disclosed. U should disclose as much
information about Y as possible and at the same time satisfy the privacy criterion. In this work, the perfect privacy condition
considered in [10] is relaxed considering an element-wise χ2 privacy criterion which we call ”Strong χ2-privacy criterion”. A
χ2-privacy criterion has been also considered in [7], studying a related privacy-utility trade-off problem. Since the optimization
problem is difficult, only upper and lower bounds on the optimal privacy-utility trade-off have been derived. Furthermore, a
convex program for designing the privacy mechanism is introduced, where additional constraints are added to the main privacy
problem. In contrast, we in this paper focus on finding an explicit design for the privacy mechanism problem for small leakage
considering our strong χ2-privacy criterion. As a side result we show that the upper bound in [7] is achievable in the small
leakage regime.
We use methods from Euclidean information theory [19], [20] to study the design optimization problem. There exist many
problems in information theory, where one main difficulty is not having a geometric structure on the space of probability
distributions. If we assume that the distributions of interest are close to each other, then KL divergence can be well approximated
by weighted squared Euclidean distance. This results in a framework where a mutual information term has been approximated
in order to simplify the optimization problem. This framework has been used in [19], [20], specifically, in [19], where it was
employed for point-to-point channels and some specific broadcast channels. In this paper, due to the strong χ2-privacy criterion,
we can exploit the information geometry approach and approximate the KL divergence and mutual information in case of a
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2Fig. 1. In this system model, disclosed data U is designed by a privacy mechanism which maximizes the information disclosed about Y and satisfies the
strong χ2-privacy criterion.
small leakage . This allows us to transfer the main problem into a analytically simple largest singular value problem, which
also provides deep intuitive understanding of the mechanism.
In more detail we can summerize our contribution as follows
(i) We present an information-theoretic disclosure control problem using a strong χ2-privacy criterion in Section II.
(ii) We introduce and utilize concepts from Euclidean information theory to linearize the problem and derive a simple
approximate solution for small leakage in Section III. In particular our result shows that the upper bound found in [7] is
actually achievable for small leakage.
(iii) We provide a geometrical interpretation of the privacy mechanism design problem and two examples are given. Significantly
that enhance the intuitive understanding of the privacy mechanism.
(iv) We transfer our methods to two extended problems which demonstrates the value of our approach as a design framework.
In the first extension, a binary channel between the agent and the user is considered, where the agent is trying to find a
mechanism to produce binary random variable U , which maximizes I(U ;Y ) under the Markov chain X −Y −U −U ′ having
a privacy criterion on X and U ′. Here U ′ is the received message by the user. In the second extension, the agent looks for a
mechanism which finds U based on observing Y maximizing the mutual information between U and Z while satisfying the
privacy criterion on U and X under the Markov chain (X,Z)− Y − U .
The paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let PXY denote the joint distribution of discrete random variables X and Y defined on finite alphabet X and Y with equal
cardinality, i.e, |X | = |Y| = K. We represent PXY by a matrix defined on RK×K and marginal distributions of X and Y
by vectors PX and PY defined on RK. We assume that each element in vectors PX and PY is non-zero. Furthermore, we
represent the leakage matrix PX|Y by a matrix defined on RK×K which is assumed to be invertible. In the related privacy
problem with perfect privacy [10], it has been shown that information can be only revealed if PX|Y is not invertible. This
result was also proved in [21] in a source coding setup. RVs X and Y denote the private data and the useful data. In this
work, privacy is measured by the strong χ2-privacy criterion which we introduce next.
Definition 1. Given two random variables X ∈ X and U ∈ U with joint pmf PXU where X describes the private data and U
denotes the disclosed data, for  > 0, the strong χ2-privacy criterion is defined as follows
χ2(PX|U=u||PX) =
∑
x∈X
(PX|U=u(x)− PX(x))2
PX(x)
=
∥∥∥[√PX−1](PX|U=u − PX)∥∥∥2 ≤ 2, ∀u ∈ U ,
where [
√
PX
−1
] is a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries {√PX(x)−1, x ∈ X}. The norm is the Euclidean norm.
The strong χ2-privacy criterion means that the all distributions (vectors) PX|U=u for all u ∈ U are close to PX in the
Euclidean sense. The closeness of PX|U=u and PX allows us to use the concepts of information geometry so that we can
locally approximate the KL divergence and mutual information between U and Y for small  > 0. In [7], the concept of
χ2-information between U and X is employed as privacy criterion. The relation between these two criteria is as follows
χ2information(X;U) = EU
[
χ2(PX|U=u||PX)
]
.
Our goal is to design the privacy mechanism that produces the disclosed data U , which maximizes I(U ;Y ) and satisfies
the strong χ2-privacy criterion. The relation between U and Y is described by the kernel PU |Y defined on RU×K. Thus, the
privacy problem can be stated as follows
max
PU|Y
I(U ;Y ), (1a)
subject to: X − Y − U, (1b)∥∥∥[√PX−1](PX|U=u − PX)∥∥∥2 ≤ 2, ∀u ∈ U . (1c)
The strong χ2-privacy criterion for small  results in closeness of PY |U=u and PY in the output distributions space, which
allows us to transfer the main problem into a linear algebra problem, specifically, finding the largest singular value of a matrix.
We refer to problem (1a) as -private data disclosure.
3Remark 1. Although we are interested in small , we do not allow  = 0 since this conflicts with our assumption that PX|Y
is invertible [21, Th. 4].
Remark 2. By using an inequality between KL divergence and the strong χ2-privacy criterion [22, Page 130], we have
D(PX|U=u||PX) ≤ χ2(PX|U=u||PX) ≤ 2, ∀u,
where D(PX|U=u||PX) denotes KL divergence between distributions PX|U=u and PX . Thus, we have
I(U ;X) =
∑
u∈U
PU (u)D(PX|U=u||PX) ≤ 2. (2)
Consequently, information leakage using the strong χ2-privacy criterion implies also a bound on the mutual information
I(U ;X). In the following we show that by using the Euclidean information theory method, we can strengthen (2) and show
that (1c) implies I(U ;X) ≤ 122 + o(2) for small .
Proposition 1. It suffices to consider U such that |U| ≤ |Y|. Furthermore, the supremum in (1a) is achieved so that we used
maximum instead of supremum.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.
III. PRIVACY MECHANISM DESIGN
In this section we follow the method used in [19], [20] and show that input and output spaces can be reduced to linear
spaces where the kernel describes a linear mapping between these two spaces. Thus, the privacy problem can be reduced to
a linear algebra problem. The solution to the linear problem is provided and elucidates the optimal mechanism for producing
U . We consider the resulting design framework to be the main contribution of this work.
By using (1c), we can rewrite the conditional distribution PX|U=u as a perturbation of PX . Thus, for any u ∈ U , we can
write PX|U=u = PX +  · Ju, where Ju ∈ RK is a perturbation vector that has the following three properties:∑
x∈X
Ju(x) = 0, ∀u, (3)∑
u∈U
PU (u)Ju(x) = 0, ∀x, (4)
∑
x∈X
J2u(x)
PX(x)
≤ 1,∀u. (5)
The first two properties ensure that PX|U=u is a valid probability distribution and the third property follows from (1c). The
next proposition shows that I(U ;X) can be locally approximated by a squared Euclidean metric. In the following we use
the Bachmann-Landau notation where o() describes the asymptotic behaviour of a function f : R+ → R which satisfies that
f()
 → 0 as → 0.
Proposition 2. For all  < minx∈X PX(x)√
maxx∈X PX(x)
, (1c) results in a leakage constraint as follows
I(X;U) ≤ 1
2
2 + o(2), (6)
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Now we show that the distribution PY |U=u can be written as a linear perturbation of PY . Since we have the Markov chain
X − Y − U , we can write
PX|U=u − PX = PX|Y [PY |U=u − PY ] =  · Ju.
Due to the assumed non-singularity of the leakage matrix we obtain
PY |U=u − PY = P−1X|Y [PX|U=u − PX ] =  · P−1X|Y Ju. (7)
The next proposition shows that I(U ;Y ) can be locally approximated by a squared Euclidean metric [19], [20]. In the following
we use the notation ∼= which is defined as
f(x) = g(x) + o(x2)→ f(x) ∼= g(x),
where g(x) is the second Taylor expansion of f(x) at point x.
4Proposition 3. For all  < |σmin(PX|Y )|miny∈Y PY (y)√
maxx∈X PX(x)
, I(U ;Y ) can be approximated as follows
I(Y ;U) ∼= 1
2
2
∑
u
PU‖[
√
PY
−1
]P−1X|Y [
√
PX ]Lu‖2, (8)
where [
√
PY
−1
] and [
√
PX ] are diagonal matrices with diagonal entries {
√
PY
−1
, ∀y ∈ Y} and {√PX , ∀x ∈ X}.
Furthermore, for every u ∈ U we have Lu = [
√
PX
−1
]Ju ∈ RK.
Proof. For the local approximation of the KL-divergence we follow similar arguments as in [19], [20]:
I(Y ;U) =
∑
u
PU (u)D(PY |U=u||PY )
=
∑
u
PU (u)
∑
y
PY |U=u(y) log
(
PY |U=u(y)
PY (y)
)
=
∑
u
PU (u)
∑
y
PY |U=u(y) log
(
1+
P−1X|Y Ju(y)
PY (y)
)
(a)
=
1
2
2
∑
u
PU
∑
y
(P−1X|Y Ju)
2
PY
+ o(2)
=
1
2
2
∑
u
PU‖[
√
PY
−1
]P−1X|Y Ju‖2 + o(2)
∼= 1
2
2
∑
u
PU‖[
√
PY
−1
]P−1X|Y [
√
PX ]Lu‖2,
where (a) comes from second order Taylor expansion of log(1 + x) which is equal to x− x22 + o(x2) and using the fact that
we have
∑
y P
−1
X|Y Ju(y) = 0. The latter follows from (3) and the property of the leakage matrix 1
T · PX|Y = 1T , we have
0 = 1T · Ju = 1T · P−1X|Y Ju,
where 1 ∈ RK denotes a vector with all entries equal to 1. For approximating I(U ;Y ), we use the second Taylor expansion of
log(1 + x). Therefore we must have |P
−1
X|Y Ju(y)
PY (y)
| < 1 for all u and y. One sufficient condition for  to satisfy this inequality
is to have  < |σmin(PX|Y )|miny∈Y PY (y)√
maxx∈X PX(x)
, since in this case we have
2|P−1X|Y Ju(y)|2 ≤ 2
∥∥∥P−1X|Y Ju∥∥∥2 ≤ 2σ2max (P−1X|Y ) ‖Ju‖2
(a)
≤ 
2 maxx∈X PX(x)
σ2min(PX|Y )
< min
y∈Y
P 2Y (y),
which implies |P
−1
X|Y Ju(y)
PY (y)
| < 1. The step (a) follows from σ2max
(
P−1X|Y
)
= 1
σ2min(PX|Y )
and ‖Ju‖2 ≤ maxx∈X PX(x). The
latter inequality follows from (5) since we have
‖Ju‖2
maxx∈X PX(x)
≤
∑
x∈X
J2u(x)
PX(x)
≤ 1.
The following result shows that by using local approximation in (8), the privacy problem defined in (1a) can be reduced to
a linear algebra problem. In more detail, by substituting Lu in (3), (4) and (5) we obtain next corollary.
Corollary 1. For all  < |σmin(PX|Y )|miny∈Y PY (y)√
maxx∈X PX(x)
, the privacy mechanism design problem in (1a) can be approximately solved
by the following linear problem
max
{Lu,PU}
∑
u
PU (u)‖W · Lu‖2, (9)
subject to: ‖Lu‖2 ≤ 1, ∀u ∈ U , (10)∑
x
√
PX(x)Lu(x) = 0, ∀u, (11)∑
u
PU (u)
√
PX(x)Lu(x) = 0, ∀x, (12)
5Fig. 2. For the privacy mechanism design, we are looking for L∗ in the red region (vector space A) which results in a vector with the largest Euclidean
norm in vector space D. Space B and space C are probability spaces for the input and output distributions, the circle in space A represents the vectors that
satisfy the strong χ2-privacy criterion and the red region denotes all vectors that are orthogonal to vector
√
PX . Starting from Space A and reaching Space
D the mapping between Space A and Space D can be found as W = [
√
PY
−1
]P−1
X|Y [
√
PX ].
where W = [
√
PY
−1
]P−1X|Y [
√
PX ] and the o(2)-term is ignored.
Condition (11) can be interpreted as an inner product between vectors Lu and
√
PX , where
√
PX ∈ RK is a vector with
entries {√PX(x), x ∈ X}. Thus, condition (11) states an orthogonality condition. Furthermore, (12) can be rewritten in vector
form as
∑
u PU (u)Lu = 0 ∈ RK using the assumption that PX(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X . Therewith, the problem in Corollary 1
can be rewritten as
max
Lu,PU :‖Lu‖2≤1,
Lu⊥
√
PX ,∑
u PU (u)Lu=0
∑
u
PU (u)‖W · Lu‖2. (13)
The next proposition shows how to simplify (13).
Proposition 4. Let L∗ be the maximizer of (14), then (13) and (14) achieve the same maximum value while U as a uniform
binary RV with L0 = −L1 = L∗ maximizes (13).
max
L:L⊥√PX , ‖L‖2≤1
‖W · L‖2. (14)
Proof. Let {L∗u, P ∗U} be the maximizer of (13). Furthermore, let u′ be the index that maximizes ‖W · L∗u‖2, i.e., u′ =
argmaxu∈U‖W · L∗u‖2. Then we have∑
u
P ∗U (u)||W · L∗u||2 ≤ ||W · L∗u′ ||2 ≤ ||W · L∗||2,
where the right inequality comes from the fact that L∗ has to satisfy one less constraint than L∗u′ . However, by choosing U
as a uniform binary RV and L0 = −L1 = L∗ the constraints in (13) are satisfied and the maximum in (14) is achieved. Thus,
without loss of optimality we can choose U as a uniformly distributed binary RV and (13) reduces to (14).
After finding the solution of (14), the conditional distributions PX|U=u and PY |U=u are given by
PX|U=0 = PX + [
√
PX ]L
∗, (15)
PX|U=1 = PX − [
√
PX ]L
∗, (16)
PY |U=0 = PY + P
−1
X|Y [
√
PX ]L
∗, (17)
PY |U=1 = PY − P−1X|Y [
√
PX ]L
∗. (18)
In next theorem we derive the solution of (14).
Theorem 1. L∗, which maximizes (14), is the right singular vector corresponding to the largest singular value of W .
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix C.
By using Theorem 1, the solution to the problem in Corollary 1 can be summarized as {P ∗U , L∗u} = {U uniform binary RV, L0 =
−L1 = L∗}, where L∗ is the solution of (14). Thus, we have the following result.
Corollary 2. The maximum value in (1a) can be approximated by 12
2σ2max for small  and can be achieved by a privacy
mechanism characterized by the conditional distributions found in (17) and (18), where σmax is the largest singular value of
W corresponding to the right singular vector L∗.
6IV. GEOMETRIC INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSIONS
In Figure 2, four spaces are illustrated. Space B and space C are probability spaces of the input and output distributions,
where the points are inside a simplex. Multiplying input distributions by P−1X|Y results in output distributions. Space A illustrates
vectors Lu with norm smaller than 1, which corresponds to the strong χ2-privacy criterion. The red region in this space includes
all vectors that are orthogonal to
√
PX . For the optimal solution with U chosen to be a equiprobable binary RV, it is shown
that it remains to find the vector Lu in the red region that results in a vector that has the largest norm in space D. This is
achieved by the principal right-singular vector of W . The mapping between space A and B is given by [
√
PX
−1
] and also the
mapping between space C and D is given by [
√
PY
−1
]. Thus W is given by [
√
PY
−1
]P−1X|Y [
√
PX ].
In following, we provide an example where the procedure of finding the mechanism to produce U is illustrated.
Example 1. Consider the leakage matrix PX|Y =
[
1
4
2
5
3
4
3
5
]
and PY is given as [ 14 ,
3
4 ]
T . Thus, we can calculate W and PX as
PX = PX|Y PY = [0.3625, 0.6375]T ,
W = [
√
PY
−1
]P−1X|Y [
√
PX ] =
[−4.8166 4.2583
3.4761 −1.5366
]
.
The singular values of W are 7.4012 and 1 with corresponding right singular vectors [0.7984,−0.6021]T and [0.6021, 0.7954]T ,
respectively. Thus the maximum of (1a) is approximately 12
2(7.4012)2 = 27.39 · 2.
The maximizing vector L∗ in (14) is equal to [0.7984,−0.6021]T and the mapping between U and Y can be calculated as
follows (the approximate maximum of I(U ;Y ) is achieved by the following conditional distributions):
PY |U=0 = PY + P
−1
X|Y [
√
PX ]L
∗ = [0.25− 3.2048 · , 0.75 + 3.2048 · ]T ,
PY |U=1 = PY − P−1X|Y [
√
PX ]L
∗ = [0.25 + 3.2048 · , 0.75− 3.2048 · ]T .
Note that the approximation is valid if |P
−1
X|Y Ju(y)
PY (y)
|  1 holds for all y and u . For the example above we have  ·P−1X|Y J0 =
[−3.2048, 3.2048]T and  · P−1X|Y J1 = [3.2048, −3.2048]T so that  0.078.
In next example we consider a BSC(α) channel as leakage matrix. We provide an example with a constant upper bound on
the approximated mutual information.
Example 2. Let PX|Y =
[
1− α α
α 1− α
]
and PY is given by [ 14 ,
3
4 ]
T . By following the same procedure we have
PX = PX|Y PY = [
2α+ 1
4
,
3− 2α
4
]T ,
W = [
√
PY
−1
]P−1X|Y [
√
PX ]
=
√2α+1(α−1)(2α−1) α√3−2α2α−1
α
√
2α+1√
3(2α−1)
√
3−2α(α−1)√
3(2α−1)
 .
Singular values of W are
√
(2α+1)(3−2α)
3(2α−1)2 ≥ 1 for α ∈ [0, 12 ) and 1 with corresponding right singular vectors [−
√
3−2α
4 ,
√
2α+1
4 ]
T
and [
√
2α+1
4 ,
√
3−2α
4 ]
T , respectively. Thus, we have L∗ = [−
√
3−2α
4 ,
√
2α+1
4 ]
T and max I(U ;Y ) ≈ 2 (2α+1)(3−2α)6(2α−1)2 with
the following conditional distributions
PY |U=0 = PY +  · P−1X|Y [
√
PX ]L
∗ = [
1
4
+
√
(3−2α)(2α+1)
4(2α−1) ,
3
4
−
√
(3−2α)(2α+1)
4(2α−1) ],
PY |U=1 = PY −  · P−1X|Y [
√
PX ]L
∗ = [
1
4
−
√
(3−2α)(2α+1)
4(2α−1) ,
3
4
+
√
(3−2α)(2α+1)
4(2α−1) ].
The approximation of I(U ;Y ) holds when we have |P
−1
X|Y [
√
PX ]L
∗
PY
|  1 for all y and u, which leads to  |2α−1|√
(3−2α)(2α+1) .
If  < |2α−1|√
(3−2α)(2α+1) , then the approximation of the mutual information I(U ;Y )
∼= 122σ2max is upper bounded by 16 for all
0 ≤ α < 12 .
Our next result discusses the relation to [7]. While the focus in the present paper is on introducing the proposed design
framework, our result also shows that an upper bound in [7] is actually achievable since we can achieve it considering even
a strong privacy criterion. In order to compare the results one needs to substitute S, X , Y and  in [7], by X , Y , U and 2,
respectively.
7Proposition 5. For all  < |σmin(PX|Y )|miny∈Y PY (y)√
maxx∈X PX(x)
, the upper bound on the privacy-utility trade-off derived in [7, Th.2], is
tight.
Proof. First we show that the approximation of I(U ;Y ) found in (8), is equal to half of the χ2-information between U and
Y . By using Proposition 2, we have
1
2
2
∑
u
PU‖[
√
PY
−1
]P−1X|Y [
√
PX ]Lu‖2 =
1
2
2
∑
u
PU
∑
y
(P−1X|Y Ju)
2
PY
=
1
2
∑
u
PU
∑
y
(PY |U=u − PY )2
PY
=
1
2
∑
u
PUχ
2(PY |U=u||PY ) = 1
2
χ2information(Y ;U).
Thus, the problem found in (9), is equivalent to the following problem
max
PU|Y
χ2information(Y ;U), (19a)
subject to: X − Y − U, (19b)∥∥∥[√PX−1](PX|U=u − PX)∥∥∥2 ≤ 2, ∀u ∈ U . (19c)
Since the strong privacy criterion in (19c) implies the privacy criterion in [7, Definition 4] and the objective functions are the
same, we conclude that the problem defined in [7, Definition 4] is an upper bound to (19a). Furthermore, the upper bound
in [7] is equal to 1λmin(X;Y )
2 for 2 ≤ λmin(X;Y ), where
√
λmin(X;Y ) is the minimum singular value of QX,Y , which is
defined in [7, Definition 2]. Next, we show that 1λmin(X;Y ) = σ
2
max(W ). The relation between W and QX,Y is as follows
QX,Y = [
√
PX
−1
]PX,Y [
√
PY
−1
] = [
√
PX
−1
]PX|Y [
√
PY ]
= W−1.
Thus, we have 1λmin(X;Y ) = σ
2
max(W ). Also,  <
|σmin(PX|Y )|miny∈Y PY (y)√
maxx∈X PX(x)
leads to the first region (2 ≤ λmin(X;Y )) of the
upper bound, since we have
|||W |||| ≤ 1
minPY
|||P−1X|Y |||(maxPX),
which implies
(σmin(PX|Y ))2(minPY )2
maxPX
≤ (σmin(PX|Y ))
2 minPY
maxPX
≤ 1
σ2max(W )
= λmin(X;Y ),
where we used spectral norm defined as |||A||| = max||x||2=1 ||Ax||22, also maxPX = maxx∈X PX(x) and minPY =
miny∈Y PY (y). The privacy mechanism found in this paper achieves σ2max(W )
2 for (19a), and since (19a) is a lower bound
to the problem defined in [7, Definition 4] and achieves the upper bound in [7, Th.2] for small , we can conclude the upper
bound in [7, Th.2] is tight for all  < |σmin(PX|Y )|miny∈Y PY (y)√
maxx∈X PX(x)
.
In next section, we study two extensions, where the idea of information geometry approximation is used.
V. EXTENSIONS
In this section, two problems are introduced. First, a fixed binary channel between the agent and the user is considered and
the agent is trying to find a mechanism to produce binary random variable U , which maximizes I(U ;Y ) under the Markov
chain X − Y −U −U ′ and privacy criterion on X and U ′. In second extension, the agent looks for a mechanism which finds
U based on observing Y , maximizing the mutual information between U and Z while satisfying the privacy criterion on U
and X under the Markov chain (X,Z) − Y − U . In these extensions, small enough  stands for all  such that the second
Taylor expansion can be used.
8A. Privacy problem with noisy disclosure channel
Similar to the previous problem let PXY denote the joint distribution of discrete random variables (X,Y ) and the leakage
matrix defined by PX|Y be invertible. Similarly, let X and Y denote the private and the useful data with equal cardinality,
i.e, |X | = |Y| = K. Other considerations on (X,Y ) mentioned in section II, are assumed in this problem. Here, we add an
invertible fixed binary channel between the agent and user denoted by PU |U ′ on R2×2, where we assume |U | = |U ′| = 2. U ′
is the message received by the user and U is the message sent by the agent. The agent tries to find a mechanism to produce
U such that maximizes I(U ;Y ) while satisfying privacy criterion on X and U ′ under the Markov chain X − Y − U − U ′.
The privacy criterion employed in this problem is as follows∥∥∥[√PX−1](PX|U ′=u′ − PX)∥∥∥2 ≤ 2, u′ ∈ {u′0, u′1}.
The information theoretic privacy problem can be characterized as follows
max
PU|Y
I(U ;Y ), (20a)
subject to: X − Y − U − U ′, (20b)∥∥∥[√PX−1](PX|U ′=u′ − PX)∥∥∥2 ≤ 1
2
2, u′ ∈ {u′0, u′1}, (20c)
Same as before, we assume that  is a small quantity. We define the matrix PU |U ′ ∈ R2×2 by
[
x y
z t
]
, where x+z = 1, y+t = 1,
and all x, y, z and t are non-negative. Furthermore, we show P−1U |U ′ by
[
a c
b d
]
, where a = txt−zy , b =
−z
xt−zy , c =
−y
xt−zy and
d = xxt−zy .
Proposition 6. The tuple (a, b, c, d) belongs to one of the following sets
A1 = {(a, b, c, d)|a ≤ 0, d ≤ 0, b ≥ 1, c ≥ 1, a+ b=1, c+ d=1},
A2 = {(a, b, c, d)|a ≥ 1, d ≥ 1, b ≤ 0, c ≤ 0, a+ b=1, c+ d=1}.
Proof. Since x+ z = 1 and y + t = 1, we have
a+ b =
t− z
xt− zy =
t− z
(1− z)t− z(1− t) = 1.
Since t ≥ 0 and z ≥ 0, one of a and b is non-negative and the other one is non-positive. Furthermore, since a + b = 1, we
have a ≤ 0, b ≥ 1 or a ≥ 1, b ≤ 0. Same proof can be used for c and d.
By using (20c), we can write PX|U=u = PX +  · Ju′ , where Ju′ ∈ RK is the perturbation vector that has three properties
as follows ∑
x∈X
Ju′(x) = 0, u
′ ∈ {u′0, u′1}, (21)
PU ′(u
′ = 0)J0 + PU ′(u′ = 1)J1 = 0, (22)∑
x∈X
J2u′(x)
PX(x)
≤ 1, u′ ∈ {u′0, u′1}, (23)
where 0 ∈ RK.
Similarly, we can show that by using the concept of Euclidean Information theory, (20c) results in a leakage constraint.
Proposition 7. For a small enough , (1c) results in a leakage constraint as follows
I(U ′;X) ≤ 1
2
2 + o(2).
Proof. The proof is similar to Proposition 2.
We show that PY |U=u can be written as a linear perturbation of PY . Since the Markov chain X − Y − U − U ′ holds, we
can write
PX|u′0 = PX|UPU |u′0 , PX|u′1 = PX|UPU |u′1 .
Thus, PX|U ′ = PX|UPU |U ′ and since PU |U ′ is invertible, we obtain
[PX|u0 PX|u1 ] = PX|U ′
[
a c
b d
]
.
9Furthermore, by using the Markov chain we have PY |U=u = P
−1
X|Y PX|U=u, which results in
PY |u0 =P
−1
X|Y [aPX|u′0+bPX|u′1 ],
PY |u1 =P
−1
X|Y [cPX|u′0+dPX|u′1 ].
Considering PY |U=u0 , we have
PY |u0 − PY = P−1X|Y [aPX|u′0 + bPX|u′1 − PX ]
= P−1X|Y [a(PX|u′0 − PX) + b(PX|u′1 − PX)]
→ PY |u0 = PY + aP−1X|Y Ju′0 + bP−1X|Y Ju′1 . (24)
Similarly, PY |U=u1 is found as follows
PY |u1 = PY + cP
−1
X|Y Ju′0 + dP
−1
X|Y Ju′1 . (25)
Now we can approximate I(U ;Y ) by a squared Euclidean metric.
Proposition 8. For a small enough , I(U ;Y ) can be approximated as follows
I(U ;Y ) ∼= 1
2
2
[
Pu0
∥∥W (aLu′0 + bLu′1)∥∥2 + Pu1 ∥∥W (cLu′0 + dLu′1)∥∥2] ,
where W is defined in Corollary 1 and Lu′ = [
√
PX
−1
]Ju′ ∈ RK for u′ ∈ {u′0, u′1}.
Proof. By using (24) and (25) we have
I(Y ;U) =
∑
u
PU (u)D(PY |U=u||PY )
= Pu0
∑
y
PY |u0 log(
PY |u0
PY
)+Pu1
∑
y
PY |u1 log(
PY |u1
PY
)
= Pu0
∑
y
(PY + aP
−1
X|Y Ju′0 + bP
−1
X|Y Ju′1) log(1 +
P−1X|Y (aJu′0 + bJu′1)
PY
)
+ Pu1
∑
y
(PY + cP
−1
X|Y Ju′0 + dP
−1
X|Y Ju′1) log(1 +
P−1X|Y (cJu′0 + dJu′1)
PY
)
=
1
2
2Pu0
∑
y
(P−1X|Y (aJu′0 + bJu′1))
2
PY
+
1
2
2Pu1
∑
y
(P−1X|Y (cJu′0 + dJu′1))
2
PY
+ o(2)
=
1
2
2Pu0
∥∥∥[√PY −1]P−1X|Y (aJu′0 + bJu′1)∥∥∥2 + 122Pu1 ∥∥∥[√PY −1]P−1X|Y (cJu′0 + dJu′1)∥∥∥2+ o(2)
∼= 1
2
2Pu0
∥∥∥[√PY −1]P−1X|Y [√PX ](aLu′0 + bŁu′1)∥∥∥2 + 122Pu1 ∥∥∥[√PY −1]P−1X|Y [√PX ](cψu′0 + dLu′1)∥∥∥2
=
1
2
2Pu0
∥∥W (aLu′0 + bLu′1)∥∥2 + 122Pu1 ∥∥W (cLu′0 + dLu′1)∥∥2
By locally approximating I(U ;Y ), the main privacy problem in (20a) can be reduced to a simple quadratic problem.
Substituting Lu in (21), (21) and (23) leads to the following result.
Corollary 3. For a small enough , the privacy mechanism design problem in (20a) can be approximately solved by the
following linear problem
max
{Lu′ ,Pu}
Pu0
∥∥W (aLu′0+bLu′1)∥∥2+Pu1∥∥W (cLu′0+dLu′1)∥∥2 (26)
subject to: ‖Lu′‖2 ≤ 1, u′ ∈ {u′0, u′1}, (27)∑
x
√
PX(x)Lu′(x) = 0, u
′ ∈ {u′0, u′1}, (28)
Pu′0Lu′0 + Pu′1Lu′1 = 0, (29)
where 0 ∈ RK.
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Remark 3. Condition (28) can be rewritten as Lu′0 ⊥
√
PX and Lu′1 ⊥
√
PX . Also the maximization is over {Lu′0 , Lu′1 , Pu0 , Pu1}.
Pu′0 and Pu′1 are replaced by aPu0 + cPu1 and bPu0 + dPu1 , since we have
[
Pu′0
Pu′1
]
= P−1U |U ′
[
Pu0
Pu1
]
.
In next proposition we derive the solution of (26).
Proposition 9. The solution of (26) is as follows
Lu′0 = −Lu′1 = ψ, Pu0 =
c− 12
c− a , Pu1 =
1
2 − a
c− a , Pu′0 = Pu′0 =
1
2
Maximum value = 4(c− 1
2
)(
1
2
− a)σ2,
where σ2 is the largest singular value of W with corresponding singular vector ψ.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix C.
Corollary 4. The maximum value in (20a) can be approximated by 22σ2(c− 12 )( 12 − a) for small  and can be achieved by
conditional distributions as follows
PY |u0 = PY + (a− b)P−1X|Y [
√
PX ]ψ,
PY |u1 = PY + (c− d)P−1X|Y [
√
PX ]ψ,
where σ2 is the largest singular value of W with corresponding singular vector
√
PX . Furthermore, the distribution of U is
as follows
Pu0 =
c− 12
c− a , Pu1 =
1
2 − a
c− a .
B. Privacy problem with utility provider
In this part, we consider a similar framework as in [11], where we have an agent and a utility provider. The agent observes
useful data denoted by RV X and the utility provider is interested in target data denoted by RV Y which is not directly
accessible by the agent but correlated with RV X . The agent receives utility by disclosing information about Y . Furthermore,
we assume X is dependent on the private data denoted by RV Z, and tried to keep it private and not disclose much information
about Z. Thus, the agent uses a privacy mechanism to produce U and tries to maximize the utility measured by I(U ;Y ) and
at the same time satisfies the privacy criterion. RV U denotes the disclosed data. Here we assume that all random variables
are discrete and have finite support, i.e., |X |, |Y|, |Z| < ∞. Since the disclosed data is produced by observing X and the
variables X , Y and Z are correlated, we have the Markov chain (Z, Y ) −X − U . We assume that |X | = |Z| = K and the
leakage matrix PZ|X ∈ RK×K is invertible. Furthermore, the marginal vectors PX , PZ and PY contain non-zero elements.
Here, privacy is measured as follows ∥∥∥[√PZ−1](PZ|U=u − PZ)∥∥∥2 ≤ 2, ∀u ∈ U .
The privacy problem is characterized as follows
max
PU|X
I(U ;Y ), (30a)
subject to: (Z, Y )−X − U, (30b)∥∥∥[√PZ−1](PZ|U=u − PZ)∥∥∥2 ≤ 1
2
2, ∀u ∈ U , (30c)
Remark 4. By using Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathe´odory’s Theorem [23], it can be shown that it suffices to consider U such that
|U| ≤ |X |+ 1. Furthermore, the maximum in (30a) is achieved so we used maximum instead of supremum.
Similarly, (30c) results in PZ|U=u = PZ + Ju, where Ju ∈ RK is the perturbation vector that has the following three
properties ∑
z∈Z
Ju(z) = 0, ∀u, (31)∑
u∈U
PU (u)Ju = 0, (32)
∑
z∈Z
J2u(z)
PZ(z)
≤ 1,∀u, (33)
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where 0 ∈ RK. By following the same procedure in Proposition 1 and using the Euclidean information concept, it can be
shown that for a small enough , (30c) results in the following leakage constraint
I(Z;U) ≤ 1
2
2 + o(2).
Now we show that PY |U=u can be written as a linear perturbation of PY . Since the Markov chain (Z, Y )−X −U holds, we
can write PX|U=u = P
−1
Z|XPZ|U=u. Thus,
PY |U=u = PY |XPX|U=u = PY |XP
−1
Z|XPZ|U=u.
By using PZ|U=u = PZ + Ju, PY |U=u can be written as follows
PY |U=u = PY |XP
−1
Z|X(PZ + Ju) = PY + PY |XP
−1
Z|XJu.
The next proposition shows that I(U ;Y ) can be locally approximated by a squared Euclidean metric.
Proposition 10. For a small enough , I(U ;Y ) can be approximated as follows
I(U ;Y ) ∼= 1
2
2
∑
u
PU (u)
∥∥∥[√PY −1]PY |XP−1Z|X [√PZ ]Lu∥∥∥2 , (34)
where Lu = [
√
PZ
−1
]Ju.
Proof. By using the local approximation of the KL-divergence we have
I(Y ;U) =
∑
u
PU (u)D(PY |U=u||PY )
=
∑
u
PU (u)
∑
y
PY |U=u(y) log
(
PY |U=u(y)
PY (y)
)
=
∑
u
PU
∑
y
PY |U=u(y) log
(
1+
PY |XP
−1
Z|XJu(y)
PY (y)
)
=
1
2
2
∑
u
PU
∑
y
(PY |XP
−1
Z|XJu)
2
PY
+ o(2)
=
1
2
2
∑
u
PU‖[
√
PY
−1
]PY |XP
−1
Z|XJu‖2 + o(2)
∼= 1
2
2
∑
u
PU‖[
√
PY
−1
]PY |XP
−1
Z|X [
√
PZ ]Lu‖2.
By substituting Lu in (31), (32) and (33), and using the local approximation in (34) we obtain the following result.
Corollary 5. For a small enough , the privacy mechanism design problem in (30a) can be approximately solved by the
following linear problem
max
{Lu,PU}
∑
u
PU (u)‖W1W2Lu‖2, (35)
subject to: ‖Lu‖2 ≤ 1, ∀u ∈ U , (36)√
PZ ⊥ Lu, ∀u, (37)∑
u
PU (u)Lu = 0, (38)
where W1 = [
√
PY
−1
]PY |X [
√
PX ] and W2 = [
√
PX
−1
]P−1Z|X [
√
PZ ].
Similar to the Proposition 3, without loss of optimality we can choose U as a uniform binary RV. Thus, (35) reduces to the
following problem
max
L:L⊥√PZ , ‖L‖2≤1
‖W1W2 · L‖2. (39)
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Let L∗ maximizes (39), thus, the conditional distributions PY |U=u which maximizes (35) are given by
PY |U=0 = PY + PY |XP
−1
Z|X [
√
PZ ]L
∗, (40)
PY |U=1 = PY − PY |XP−1Z|X [
√
PZ ]L
∗. (41)
In the next theorem, the solution of (39) is derived.
Theorem 2. Let σmax be the largest singular value of W1W2 corresponding to the singular vector ψ. Furthermore, let φ
be the singular vector of W1W2 corresponding the second largest singular value. If σmax > 1, ψ maximizes (39), and if
σmax = 1, φ is the maxmizer of (39).
Proof. The largest singular value of W1 is 1 corresponding to singular vector
√
PZ and the smallest singular value of W2 is
1 corresponding to singular vector
√
PZ . Furthermore, we show that 1 is one of the singular values of W1W2 corresponding
to singular vector
√
PZ . We have
WT2 W
T
1 W1W2
√
PX =[
√
PZ ]
T
(
P−1Z|X
)T
[
√
PX
−1
]T [
√
PX ]
TPTY |X [
√
PY
−1
]T [
√
PY
−1
]PY |X [
√
PX ][
√
PX
−1
]P−1Z|X [
√
PZ ]
√
PZ
=[
√
PZ ]
T
(
P−1Z|X
)T
[
√
PX
−1
]T [
√
PX ]
TPTY |X1
=[
√
PZ ]
T1 =
√
PZ .
Thus, we have two cases as σmax > 1 and σmax = 1. In first case, ψ is orthogonal to
√
PZ and so maximizes (39). In second
case, ψ =
√
PZ and φ is orthogonal to
√
PZ . Thus, φ maximizes (39). There are no other cases since 1 is one of the singular
values.
Corollary 6. Let σmax and σ2 be the first and second largest singular values of W1W2. If σmax > 1, the maximum value in
(30a) can be approximated by 12
2σ2max and can be achieved by a privacy mechanism characterized by conditional distributions
found in (40) and (41) where L∗ = ψ. Otherwise, the maximum value can be approximated by 12
2σ22 and can be achieved by
(40) and (41) where L∗ = φ.
Remark 5. One simple example for the second case where σmax = 1 is letting PZ|X = PY |X . In this case, W1 = W−12
and so all singular values of W1W2 are equal to one. The maximum value in (39) is 1 and can be achieved by any vector
orthogonal to
√
PZ .
Remark 6. One sufficient condition for the first case where σmax > 1, is to have σmax(W2) = 1σmin(W1) and not all singular
values are equal to 1. Since in this case we have
|||W1W2||| ≥ |||W2||||||W−11 |||
=
σmax(W2)
σmax(W
−1
1 )
= σmax(W2)σmin(W1) = 1,
where we used the spectral norm.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have shown that Euclidean information theory can be used to linearize an information-theoretic disclosure control problem.
When a small  privacy leakage is allowed, a simple approximate solution is derived. A geometrical interpretation of the privacy
mechanism design is provided. Four linear spaces are introduced to further interpret the structure of the optimization problem. In
particular, we look for a vector satisfying the constraint of having the largest Euclidean norm in other space, leading to finding
the largest principle singular value of a matrix. The proposed approach establishes a useful and general design framework,
which has been demonstrated in two problem extensions that included a noisy disclosure channel and privacy design with
utility provider.
APPENDIX A
As shown in (7), PY |U=u must belong to Ψ for every u ∈ U which is defined as follows
Ψ = {y ∈ RK|y = PY + P−1X|Y J, ‖J‖2PX ≤ 1, 1T · J = 0},
where ‖J‖2PX =
∑
x
J(x)2
PX(x)
is the weighted Euclidean norm. For all < |σmin(PX|Y )|miny∈Y PY (y)√
maxx∈X PX(x)
, any point in Ψ is a probability
distribution and hence Ψ is a subset of the standard K−1 dimension simplex. Thus, Ψ is bounded. Let J1 = {J ∈ RK|1T ·J =
0} and J2 = {J ∈ RK| ‖J‖2PX ≤ 1}. J1 and J2 correspond a hyperplane and an elipsoide, respectively. The set J = J1 ∩J2
is closed since each J1 and J2 is closed. Considering the sequence {y0, y1, ..} where each yi is inside the set Ψ, we have
lim
i→∞
yi = lim
i→∞
PY + P
−1
X|Y Ji = PY + P
−1
X|Y limi→∞
Ji.
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Since J is a closed set limi→∞ Ji ∈ J and hence limi→∞ yi ∈ Ψ. Thus, Ψ is a compact set. We define a vector mapping
θ : Ψ→ RK as follows
θi(pY |U(·|U)) = pY |U (yi|u), i ∈ [1 : K − 1],
θK = H(Y |U = u).
Since the mapping θ is continuous and the set Ψ is compact, by using Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathe´odory’s Theorem [23] for
every U with p.m.f F (u) there exists a random variable U ′ with p.m.f F (u′) such that |U ′| ≤ K and collection of conditional
p.m.fs PY |U ′(·|u′) ∈ Ψ where ∫
u
θi(p(y|u))dF (u) =
∑
u′∈U ′
θi(p(y|u′))p(u′).
It ensures that by replacing U by U ′, I(U ;Y ) and the distribution PY are preserved. Furthermore, the condition
∑
u′ PU ′(u
′)Ju′ =
0 is satisfied since we have
PY =
∑
u′
PU ′PY |U ′=u′ → PX =
∑
u′
PU ′PX|U ′=u′∑
u′
PU ′(PX|U ′=u′ − PX) = 0→
∑
u′
PU ′(u
′)Ju′ = 0.
Note that any point in Ψ satisfies the strong privacy criterion, i.e., the equivalent U ′ satisfies the per-letter privacy criterion as
well. Thus, without loss of optimality we can assume |U| ≤ K.
Let A = {PU |Y (·|·)|U ∈ U , Y ∈ Y, ||U| ≤ K} and Ay = {PU |Y (·|y)|U ∈ U , |U| ≤ K}, ∀y ∈ Y . Ay is a standard
|U| − 1 simplex and since |U| ≤ |Y| < ∞ it is compact. Thus A = ∪y∈YAy is compact. And the set A′ = {PU |Y (·|·) ∈
A|X − Y − U,∥∥[PX ]−1(PX|U=u − PX)∥∥2 ≤ 2, ∀u} is a closed subset of A since χ2 information is closed of the interval
[0, 2]. Therefore, A′ is compact. Since I(U ;Y ) is a continuous mapping over A′, the supremum is achieved. Thus, we use
maximum instead of supremum.
APPENDIX B
The KL divergence is denoted by D(·||·).
I(X;U) =
∑
u∈U
PU (u)D(PX|U=u||PX)
=
∑
u
PU (u)
∑
x
PX|U=u log(
PX|U=u
PX
)
(a)
=
∑
u
PU (u)
∑
x
(PX +  · Ju) log(1 +  Ju
PX
)
=
∑
u
PU (u)[
∑
x
(Ju +
1
2
2
J2u
PX
)] + o(2)
=
1
2
2
∑
u∈U
PU (u)‖[
√
PX
−1
]Ju‖2 + o(2),
(b)
≤ 1
2
2 + o(2),
where (a) follows from PX|U=u = PX +  · Ju and (b) follows from the third property of Ju stated in (5). Furthermore, for
approximating I(U ;X) we should have | Ju(x)PX(x) | < 1 for all x and u. One sufficient condition is to have  <
minx∈X PX(x)√
maxx∈X PX(x)
.
Thus the privacy criterion implies a bounded mutual information leakage.
APPENDIX C
We first show that the smallest singular value of W is 1 with
√
PX as corresponding right singular vector. We have
WTW
√
PX = [
√
PX ](P
T
X|Y )
−1[
√
PY
−1
][
√
PY
−1
]P−1X|Y [
√
PX ]
√
PX
= [
√
PX ](P
T
X|Y )
−1[
√
PY
−1
][
√
PY
−1
]PY
= [
√
PX ](P
T
X|Y )
−11 = [
√
PX ]1 =
√
PX .
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Now we show that all other singular values are greater than or equal to 1. Equivalently, we show that all singular values of
W−1 = [
√
PX
−1
]PX|Y [
√
PY ] are smaller than or equal to 1, i.e., we need to prove that for any vector α ∈ RK we have
||W−1α||2 ≤ ||α||2. (42)
In the following, we use PYj = PY (yj), PXi = PX(xi) and PXi|Yj = PX|Y (xi|yj) for simplicity. More explicitly we claim
to have
αT (W−1)TW−1α =
K∑
j=1
α2j
K∑
i=1
P 2Xi|YjPYj
PXi
+
K∑
m,n=1
m 6=n
αmαn
K∑
i=1
PXi|YmPXi|Yn
√
PYnPYm
PXi
≤
K∑
i=1
α2i .
By using
P 2Xi|YjPYj
PXi
= PXi|YjPYj |Xi , we can rewrite the last inequality as follows
K∑
j=1
α2j
K∑
i=1
PXi|YjPYj |Xi +
K∑
m,n=1
m 6=n
αmαn
K∑
i=1
PXi|YmPXi|Yn
√
PYnPYm
PXi
≤
K∑
i=1
α2i ,
Equivalently, by using
∑K
i=1
∑K
m=1 PXi|YjPYm|Xi = 1, we claim to have
K∑
m,n=1
m 6=n
αmαn
∑
i
PXi|YmPXi|Yn
√
PYnPYm
PXi
≤
∑
j
α2j [
∑
i
∑
m 6=j
PXi|YjPYm|Xi ].
Finally, we can see that the last inequality holds, since for any i by using the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means
and PXi|YmPYn|XiPXi|YnPYm|Xi =
PXi|YmPXi|YnPXi,YnPXi,Ym
P 2Xi
=
(
PXi|YmPXi|Yn
√
PYnPYm
PXi
)2
, we have
2αmαn
PXi|YmPXi|Yn
√
PYnPYm
PXi
≤ α2mPXi|YmPYn|Xi + α2nPXi|YnPYm|Xi ,
where we use
PXi|YmPYn|XiPXi|YnPYm|Xi =
PXi|YmPXi|YnPXi,YnPXi,Ym
P 2Xi
=
(
PXi|YmPXi|Yn
√
PYnPYm
PXi
)2
.
Therefore, one is the smallest singular value of W with
√
PX as corresponding right singular vector. Furthermore, we have
that the right singular vector of the largest singular value is orthogonal to
√
PX . Thus, the principal right-singular vector is
the solution of (14).
APPENDIX D
First, assume that the maximum occurs in non-zero Pu′0 and Pu′1 . For simplicity we show Pu0 and Pu1 by P0 and P1, also
we show Pu′0 and Pu′1 by P
′
0 and P
′
1. By using (29), we have
Lu′0 = −
P ′1
P ′0
Lu′1 = −
bP0 + dP1
aP0 + cP1
Lu′1 .
Since
∥∥Lu′0∥∥2 ≤ 1, thus, ∥∥∥P ′1P ′0Lu′1∥∥∥2 ≤ 1, which results in ∥∥Lu′1∥∥ ≤ min{1, (P ′0P ′1 )2} ≤ 1. With the same argument ∥∥Lu′0∥∥ ≤
min{1, (P ′1P ′0 )
2} ≤ 1. Now we consider two cases:
1. Case 1: |P ′0| ≥ |P ′1|, 2. Case 2: |P ′1| ≥ |P ′0|.
Case 1 : In this case we have |aP0 + cP1| ≥ |bP0 + dP1|, which results in
(a− c)P0 + c ≥ 1
2
, (43)
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since b = 1− a and d = 1− c. Then, we substitute Lu′0 by − bP0+dP1aP0+cP1Lu′1 in the objective function, which results in
P0
∥∥W (aLu′0 + bLu′1)∥∥2 + P1 ∥∥W (cLu′0 + dLu′1)∥∥2
=
∥∥WLu′1∥∥P0(b− abP0 + adP1aP0 + cP1
)2
+
∥∥WLu′1∥∥P1(b− cbP0 + cdP1aP0 + cP1
)2
=
∥∥WLu′1∥∥P0 (bc− ad)2P 21(aP0 + cP1)2 + ∥∥WLu′1∥∥P1 (ad− bc)
2P 20
(aP0 + cP1)2
=
∥∥WLu′1∥∥ (bc− ad)2( P0(1− P0)((a− c)P0 + c)2
)
.
Now we show that the maximum of f(P0) =
P0(1−P0)
((a−c)P0+c)2 occurs in P
∗
0 =
c− 12
c−a . The derivative of f with respect to P0 is as
follows
d
dP0
f =
c− (a+ c)P0
((a− c)P0 + c)2 .
By using Proposition 6, we have two cases for a and c, a ≥ 1, c ≤ 0 or a ≤ 0, c ≥ 1. For a ≥ 1, c ≤ 0 we have
a − c ≥ 0, which implies P0 ≥
1
2−c
a−c by using (43). We show that f(P0) is a decreasing function in this case. If a + c ≥ 0,
then c − (a + c)P0 ≤ 0 and if a + c ≥ 0, then −(a + c)P0 ≤ −(a + c) which results in c − (a + c)P0 ≤ −a ≤ −1 < 0.
Thus, for a ≥ 1, c ≤ 0, f(P0) is decreasing and its maximum happens in P ∗0 =
1
2−c
a−c . Now consider a ≤ 0, c ≥ 1. In this
case we have P0 ≤
1
2−c
a−c . We show that f(P0) is an increasing function. If a + c ≤ 0, then P0(a + c) ≤ 0 which results in
c ≥ 1 > 0 ≥ (a + c)P0. And if a + c ≥ 0, then (a + c)P0 ≤ (c−
1
2 )(a+c)
c−a ≤ c, since 2ac ≤ 0 ≤ a+c2 . Thus, f(P0) is an
increasing function and its maximum occurs in P ∗0 =
1
2−c
a−c . The maximum value of f(P0) is
(c− 12 )( 12−a)
4(c−a)2 .
Case 2: In this case we have |aP0 + cP1| ≤ |bP0 + dP1|, which results in
(a− c)P0 + c ≥ 1
2
. (44)
We substitute Lu′1 by −aP0+cP1bP0+dP1Lu′0 in the objective function, which results in
P0
∥∥W (aLu′0 + bLu′1)∥∥2 + P1 ∥∥W (cLu′0 + dLu′1)∥∥2 = ∥∥WLu′0∥∥ (bc− ad)2( P0(1− P0)((b− d)P0 + d)2
)
.
By the same arguments it can be shown that maximum of P0(1−P0)((b−d)P0+d)2 occurs in P
∗
0 =
d− 12
d−b =
1
2−c
a−c . Thus for both cases we
have
P ∗0 =
1
2 − c
a− c , p
∗
1 =
a− 12
a− c , P
′∗
0 = P
′∗
1 =
1
2
.
So the maximum of (26) occurs in Lu′0 = −Lu′1 = ψ, where ψ is the singular vector corresponding to largest singular value
of W , if both P ′0 and P
′
1 are non-zero, and the maximum value is 4(c− 12 )( 12 − a)σ2.
Now we assume that P ′0 or P
′
1 for instance P
′
0 is zero, which implies Lu′1 = 0 and P
′
1 = 1. Thus, the objective function
reduces to ∥∥WLu′0∥∥2 (a2P0 + c2P1) .
Since P ′0 = aP0 + cP1 = 0, we have
P0 = − c
a
P1 → P0 = −c
a− c , P1 =
a
a− c ,
Thus, the objective function is
∥∥WLu′0∥∥2 (−ac), where the maximum value is −acσ2. We show that 4(c− 12 )( 12 − a) ≥ −ac.
This is true since we have 2(a+ c)− 3ac ≥ 1 due to a ≥ 1, c ≤ 0 or a ≤ 0, c ≥ 1. Thus, the maximization of (26) occurs
in P ′0 = P
′
1 =
1
2 . Furthermore, Lu′0 = −Lu′1 = ψ satisfies the conditions (28) and (29), since ψ is orthogonal to
√
PX .
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